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Findings  and Conclusions 
 
 
The case studies included in this volume were not chosen to be 
representative of the universe of projects being operated under Title 
III of JTPA. Rather, they represent projects with different forms of 
organization, providing varied services to diverse populations of 
dislocated workers. The only commonality is that they were thought 
to be successful program models by state and local program staff. As 
noted in the introduction, the purpose of this volume is to present some 
of the lessons learned from these studies that may be of use to those 
interested in employment and training policy and to operators of Title 
III projects. 
Overall, these projects, despite some individual problems, were 
generally successful. Table 11-1 shows the outcomes of the individual 
case studies for the placement rate of terminees, the cost per placement, 
and the wage replacement ratio for individuals placed. For comparison, 
the table also presents the average results on the same variables for the six 
Dislocated Worker Demonstration Projects funded with fiscal year 1983 
CETA money. 
Success, measured in comparison to the average for the CETA 
demonstrations, is obviously relative. That the JTPA projects are defined 
as successful does not mean they meet the objectives of section 106 of 
the Act-to increase long-term earnings of the participants beyond what 
they would have been without the program. Rather, the measures being 
used are short-term indicators of success. To determine the long- term 
impact of the program, it would be necessary to have a control group 
or observe the counterfactual outcome. That is, what proportion 
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a. Serving the Dislocated Worker: A Report on the Dislocated Worker Demonstration Proxram. Abt Associates. Inc., U S. Department of Labor, Employment 
and Training Administration, Washington, D.C., December 1983 Figure 4 1 and table IV .11. Placement  rates  were recalculated  to mclude  recalls based 
on data from the ind1v1dual case studies 
b. This excluded a number of md1v1duals (130) in a "service" category. If these ind1v1duals are included, the placement rate would be 63 percent. 
c. The official placement rate (45 percent) only includes placements al $5.25 or more per hour 
'°+
 
   Wage 
Placement  replacement 
rate Cost per ratio 
Projects Size (percent) placement (percent) 
Cummins Engine Company 708 83 $3,732 69 
GM-UAW Metroplitan Pontiac PREP 2,189 93 $900-$1,000 NA 
 Minnesota Iron Range 1,324 62 $863 62 ::s 
Missouri Job Search Assistance, Inc. 963 78 $1,023 83  
Cone-Mills Project 360 98b NA 86  
United Labor Agency 1,083 6o+c $829-$906 89  
Houston Community College 855 74 $1,735 71  
Tacoma Copper Smelter 366 85 $1,240 78  
Dane County, Wisconsin 218 60 $4,000 85  
Dislocated  worker  demonstrations  under  CETAa 1,040 55 $2,324 70  
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of these dislocated workers would have been placed in employment and 
what wages would they have received in the absence of the program. 
All of the case study projects had placement rates higher than the 
average for the CETA-funded demonstrations. An apparent exception, 
the United Labor Agency Project in Cleveland, Ohio, had a lower 
reported placement rate because only individuals placed at wages above 
the performance standard for the state ($5.25 per hour) were counted 
as placed. If placements at lower wage rates were included, the place- 
ment rate for that project would have exceeded 60 percent. 
At the same time, the Hillsborough Cone-Mills project, with a reported 
placement rate of 98 percent, excludes 130 individuals who were in 
what was called the "service" category, which is, essentially, individual 
job search following program services. If these individuals are considered 
to have been terminated but not placed, the placement rate for this proj- 
ect would drop to 63 percent, above the average for the CETA 
demonstrations, but not as positive as the project's statistics would 
suggest. 
Two of the case study sites, the Cummins Engine Company and Dane 
County projects, had costs above the average for the demonstrations 
($2,324 per placement). However, the average cost for the Dislocated 
Worker Demonstrations excludes two sites that, for specific reasons, 
had very high costs (Southgate and Alameda). Further, the cost per place- 
ment in the Cummins Engine Company project is biased upward by 
the large number of individuals who were still in the project. The cost 
per placement for the Cone-Mills project could not be estimated because 
it was part of a statewide program. 
Finally, among the case studies for which a wage replacement ratio 
could be calculated, only two had ratios below the average for the CETA 
demonstrations. It is interesting to note that both of these cases, the 
Cummins Engine Company and Minnesota Iron Range projects, involved 
layoffs in the major high-wage industry in an otherwise rural and low- 
wage area. 
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Project Targeting 
Probably the most obvious point  about  program  targeting,  evident in 
the Pontiac Retraining and Employment Program, is the determina- tion 
of who is truly a displaced, as opposed to a cyclically unemployed, 
worker. Early discussion of the number of dislocated workers in the nation 
had to do with the separation of these populations.  The number  of 
dislocated workers was variously estimated from 300,000 to 5.1 million 
people. 
It appears that something closer to the smaller number is probably more 
accurate. A large number of technically dislocated  workers have, in fact, 
been recalled to their old jobs or have found employment in variations of 
them. Not only was this the case in the Pontiac project, another potential 
project was dropped from the study sample when the entire eligible 
population had been recalled by the time the project was organized. 
Further, 10 percent of the terminees in the CETA Dislocated Worker 
Demonstrations were recalled by their previous employers. This suggests 
that better targeting of programs by the states is needed to avoid spending 
money on people who will eventually return to their previous employer. 
As noted in the Pontiac case study, "it is possible that the potential 
participants had a better idea of the probability of being recalled than did 
the employment and training professionals.'' For these workers, extended 
unemployment benefits or income maintenance may be more appropriate 
than training. The policy problem is, of course, to identify them ahead of 
time-project targeting. 
The specific targeting of the projects also varied. The Hillsborough, 
ASARCO, and Pontiac projects were plant-specific, and, in the latter 
two cases, also union member-specific. Under these circumstances, the 
targeting was fairly clear-cut and initial screening excluded those who 
were not in the specific target group. However, in the case of the 
Hillsborough project, a small proportion of the participants were not 
from the Cone-Mills plant; this is the result of the ripple effects of the 
closing of the largest plant in the local community. 
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With the exception of the ASARCO project, there was no project that 
ended up being 100 percent plant- or industry-specific. With this ex- 
ception, in cases in which a particular plant or a particular industry was 
targeted, the project also eventually served people from the communi- 
ty who were adversely affected by the primary dislocation in the area. 
In the case of the Hillsborough Cone-Mills project, affected individuals 
from the local economy were served. In the case of the Minnesota Iron 
Range project, people from the local community as well as spouses of 
the iron miners and the children of both groups who were attempting 
to find work upon graduation from high school were served-the latter 
two groups with the SDA's Title IIA funds. 
In those cases in which the targeting was on all Title ill eligibles within 
a geographic area, there was no screening problem beyond the deter- 
mination of eligibility,  though  in these cases the mix of services  had  to 
be more varied to deal with the differing skill levels of the participants. 
Many eligible people dislocated from a given plant never come in. 
Although the Cummins Engine Company was the source of the largest 
number of layoffs in the three-county area, only 17 percent of the par- 
ticipants in the project were from Cummins. This supports the Cum- mins' 
contention that the project was really designed to serve the entire 
community, but also underscores the fact that many of the workers from 
a particular plant either wait for recall, retire, or find other opportunities 
without the aid of a project. In the Cummins project, program opera-  tion 
began two and one-half years after the workers were laid off. Con- 
sequently, the majority of those workers had to find other employment 
without the services provided by the Title III project. 
This also appears to be the case in the ASARCO project. Of the 600 
laid off, 118 took early retirements and 366 enrolled in the project. One- 
fifth of the eligibles never came in. In all of the case study sites, older 
workers who had supplementary benefits or the ability to ''hang on'' 
until retirement never participated in the projects. Few members of the 
older segment of the eligible population are served by these programs, 
even though the proportion of older participants tends to be higher than 
in Title IIA programs. 
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In unionized industries that have negotiated supplementary unemploy- 
ment benefits, individuals who have these benefits may attempt to wait 
until they are convinced that the plant will not recall them or until they run 
out of benefits. If the project opens its doors immediately, lower 
enrollments than planned may result. Until it is obvious that the plant will 
not be reopened or the recall notices will not come, senior workers may 
not be willing to participate in the program. Furthermore, when 
Unemployment Insurance, Trade Adjustment payments,  Supplemen- tary 
Unemployment Benefits and severance pay amount to 50 to 70 per- cent 
of previous take home pay, there may be little inclination to par- ticipate 
in a program that promises employment with an expected wage 
replacement rate of 65 percent and concomitant loss of these benefits. 
In the case of plant closings, it is possible to obtain advance  notice and 
to set up the project in anticipation of the plant closing. Then, the potential 
dislocated workers can be identified, assessment performed, and a 
program tailored to the needs of the eligible population can be designed. 
In the case of major layoffs, such action is generally not possi- ble. 
Because of the possible effects on the morale of the employees, companies 
are not inclined to announce layoffs ahead of time. Advance notice of 
plant closings may assist in the design of the project but may adversely 
affect the production of the plant. In the Hillsborough plant, 130 people 
left or retired in the period between  the announcement  of the closing and 
the time when the plant actually closed. While this may be disruptive to 
the company, it reduces  the number  of individuals  to be served by the 
project. 
In the case of the ASARCO  project,  virtually  all employees  stayed to 
the end. This may have been quite rational in terms of the relative wage 
levels and the condition of the labor market in the area. Also, unlike the 
Hillsborough project, unemployment and supplementary unemployment 
benefits, as well as severance pay, were contingent upon holding on until 
the closure. The history of the industry also held the hope that the '' gates 
might reopen.·· 
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Intake and Selection 
In the six CETA-funded Dislocated Worker Demonstrations, dif- 
ferences in recruitment practices between projects which had a target 
group of workers from specific plants and projects which served  all Title 
III eligibles in the community were observed. In the former case, 
companies and unions were willing to assist in the identification of. and 
contacts with, laid-off workers. In the latter case, a less structured pro- 
cedure of public announcements through radio, television and newspaper 
advertisements was the most common method for making contact with 
eligible unemployed workers. 
Differences are also observed in the recruitment practices of projects 
included in these case studies. In cases where the target group was plant- 
or industry-specific (the Hillsborough, Michigan PREP, Minnesota Iron 
Range and ASARCO projects), local project staff involved management 
or the labor union in the recruitment of eligible workers. This was also 
true in the Dane County and United Labor Agency projects. 
For example, the program staff of the Hillsborough project received 
a master list of laid-off employees from the personnel department of 
the Cone-Mills plant, which was used as a mailing list. The master list 
was also a means of checking eligibility for the program, and a way of 
defining the primary target group to give them priority for program 
services. In addition, management posted program information around 
the plant and paid for radio and newspaper advertisements. In the Pon- 
tiac project, the UAW and General Motors provided project staff with 
the names and addresses of all laid-off auto workers with recall rights, 
i.e., the target group for the project. In the ASARCO project, an- 
nouncements, intake and assessment were completed in the plant before 
its closing. 
Recruitment of eligibles in cases where the target group for the proj- ect 
was not plant-specific primarily relied on print and television media. In 
Missouri and Indiana, for example, program operators attempted to recruit 
through advertisements. 
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None of the projects experienced any buildup problems, although some, 
such as the Cummins project, experienced lower numbers of ap- plications 
than anticipated and never really had an applicant pool. However, 
involvement of management and labor unions in recruitment efforts does 
facilitate immediate contact with the eligible population and also adds to 
the credibility of the program. The only other project that experienced 
recruitment problems relied on "walk-ins" and a computer system 
designed to generate the name, phone number and occupational code for 
UI claimants and exhaustees. 
If the target group is laid-off workers from a plant closing, as in the 
ASARCO project,  recruitment  can  begin  before  layoff.  Recruitment is 
more difficult when the plant or union has lost contact with the workers. 
In the Pontiac project, for instance, recruitment did not begin until five 
years after the first layoffs occurred.  As a  result,  30 percent of the laid-
off workers could not be located by mail. 
In the Cummins case study, although the Cummins plant accounted  for 
almost half of the 3,400 eligible dislocated workers,  the  fact  that the 
layoffs had occurred two years before the project started was con- sidered 
the primary reason why these workers constituted only 17 per- cent of the 
participants. The others presumably ''found their own way.'' 
If there is a large eligible population from which to select participants, 
as in the Minnesota Iron Range, Cleveland United Labor Agency, and 
Pontiac projects, almost any recruitment strategy will produce the desired 
number of applicants. In these cases, the more important question  is how 
to build program enrollments without creating lengthy waiting periods 




The earlier Dislocated Worker Demonstrations involved prescreen- 
ing based on education, attitudes and motivation to improve the prob- 
able placement success of the program. None of the programs observ- 
ed for these case studies had any such screening procedure. For exam- 
Findings and Conclusions 201 
 
pie, participants in the Cummins project were screened only to deter- mine 
eligibility. Following eligibility verification, workers participated in a 
three-day assessment program to develop an employability plan. 
Participants then voluntarily enrolled in one of several program activities. 
As noted, this was because the advisory board wanted everyone to '' go 
away with something,'' even  those  who did  not choose  to participate  in 
any of the program services. In the case of the Job Search Assistance, Inc., 
(JSA) program in Missouri, intake sessions  were scheduled  bas- ed on 
the expectation of a certain number of eligibles coming in. Staff noted, 
however, that if more people than expected came in, they would simply 
increase the size of the job club. 
Assessment was a major part of all projects observed in the case studies. 
Seven of the nine projects combined collection of information on 
participant work history, skill level, occupational interests and educa- tion 
with formal tests of aptitude and skill level. The other two projects 
included in their assessment work histories and skill levels as reported by 
the participants. All nine had some procedure for assessing the par- 
ticipants' skill needs, abilities and the types of training and jobs that might 
match their abilities and skills. 
The results of the assessment and testing were used by most projects 
to develop, in varying degrees of formality, an employability plan. 
Counselors informed the participants of the test results, presented the 
service options, and discussed job possibilities. Choosing program ac- 
tivities was left to the participant, with counselors providing guidance. 
For example, in the Minnesota Iron Range project, results of the ap- 
titude test were reviewed by the counselors, and participants were 
discouraged from entering training for which they lacked ability or 
aptitude. 
The case studies suggest that assessment and testing were important 
parts of the program. While participants were allowed to express their 
interest in a particular plan or program activity, as in the ASARCO 
project, the counselors also had a role in those decisions. 
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Service Mix 
The service mix in the case study projects is summarized in table 11-2. 
The information in the table is not completely comparable, because the 
services were defined differently in the different projects, particularly 
counseling, assessment and job search. For example,  assessment  may be 
the first activity in the job search skills segment  of  the job club,  as is the 
case in the Job Search Assistance, Inc. project in Missouri. Another project 
may record that the participant received assessment only if money was 
expended specifically for formal assessment, as in the case of the United 
Labor Agency project in Cleveland. However, even with these limitations, 
several points emerge from the table. 
Most obviously, although the emphasis and primary services provided 
by the projects vary, no project offered only a single service,  such  as job 
search. This was true even in the case of the Job Search Assistance, Inc. 
project in Missouri. Although JSA originally  had  to be pressured by the 
state to use OJT, project staff indicated that the more comprehen- sive 
program improved their placement results. Similarly, those proj- ects that 
emphasized assessment and counseling (the United Labor Agen- cy 
project and the Dane County project) also made training services available 
to participants. 
Two more points emerge from all of the case studies. First, all had 
flexibility built into the service mix of the projects. Second,  all gave free 
choice to the participants in choosing among the available services. In 
every case, a worker was free to enroll in a particular part of the program. 
This was, of course,  subject  to availability  and  sometimes, as with the 
Houston Community College-Texas Employment Commis- sion project, 
to the requirement that individuals go through a job search component as 
the initial program activity. Though often combined with mandatory 
assessment and screening, however, the degree of volun- tarism is 
striking. 
One constraint on available services is the willingness of contractors to 
take performance-based contracts, exemplified  by  the  JSA  project in 
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tracts, the use of particular contractors depends upon their prior track 
record, as in the Minnesota Iron Range, Cummins and Dane County 
projects. 
A further example of this kind of flexibility is illustrated in the Pon- tiac 
project. A small but significant part of this program was assess- ment, 
counseling and job search assistance for 75 eligible individuals who did 
not want to return to the auto industry. It was suggested that  this program 
might be provided at the time of layoff to individuals who choose to 
change occupations rather than continue in a boom and bust industry. 
Another point is that only in the case of the Minnesota Iron Range  and 
ASARCO projects, where they were backed by state Title ill funds, were 
project officials willing to support long-term large-scale institu- tional 
training. This, of course, was stimulated in these cases by the nature of the 
local labor market. In the other projects,  one-year  fund- ing and pressure 
from the Department of  Labor to spend  the funds led to a concentration 
on short-term strategies and job search. In the Cleveland United Labor 
Agency project. both project staff and the case study author indicated that, 
had they been able to provide longer term training in advanced technology, 
a growing industry in the Cleveland- Cuyahoga County labor market, they 
could have increased their place- ment and wage replacement percentages. 
The other source of pressure for short-term services, best illustrated 
by the Hillsborough Cone-Mills project, is the clear preference among 
dislocated workers for immediate income and, therefore, for job search 
and on-the-job training as opposed to classroom training. This is par- 
ticularly true where completion of training holds no definite promise 
of a job. 
Expenditures under Title ill have consistently run below budget, while 
the number of individuals served has been above  projections.  Almost all 
of these projects have run a job search or job club program as the  first 
service, because dislocated workers, although they may have skills, have 
not been in the job market for a number of years and are not familiar 
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with resume writing or the procedures for finding a job. As one author 
put it, they are accustomed to '' come in today, show up for work tomor- 
row' ' hiring procedures. 
 
Relation to the Lo,bor Market 
The appropriateness of the project to the labor market is illustrated 
in the Cummins project. Staff there started by adopting the Downriver 
project's strategy of relying on job search assistance. However, the 
Downriver project involved several plant closings in an area with a 
substantial number of similar firms not experiencing layoffs and took 
place early in the recession. Therefore, job search was appropriate as 
the major service. The utility of transferring this model to southern In- 
diana, where the major industry was the Cummins plant and the firms 
that supply it represented a rather different labor market, is not im- 
mediately obvious. In fact, the Cummins project had to revise its pro- 
gram model to retrain dislocated workers for job openings within the 
area. 
All nine projects show that it is efficient to operate a job search com- 
ponent at the outset of a program, thereby reducing training costs for those 
who may be able to readily find a job. Such action raises the proj- ect's 
placement rates while reducing the cost per placement. The case studies 
also demonstrate that there may be certain services that are par- ticularly 
appropriate to the Title III eligible population. Examples in- clude the 
certification of existing skills, as in the Minnesota Iron Range project, and 
the use of technical skills from the previous job in a sales capacity, an 
effective strategy for dealing with relatively skilled workers in the case of 
the Houston Community College-Texas Employment Com- mission 
project. These cost efficient strategies may be applicable in other areas or 
projects. The ASARCO project, with its impressive outcome measures, is 
much closer to the Dislocated Worker project ''model.'' 
Counseling 
Essentially, three types of counseling were provided in the projects. 
Although counseling and the emphasis on particular types of counsel- 
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ing vary among the projects, all provided personal and financial counsel- 
ing; job search skills counseling; and counseling with regard to the labor 
market and wage expectations. 
Many eligible dislocated workers, particularly those who have ex- 
hausted their unemployment benefits and savings, need financial counsel- 
ing, including advice on debt consolidation, home equity loans, etc. 
Many long-term unemployed individuals also require counseling and 
referral to social service agencies for alcoholism or drug dependence, 
spouse or child abuse, welfare application, etc. 
Many of these individuals, furthermore, have been employed for many 
years in the same firm and need counseling regarding job search skills: 
how to prepare a resume,  how  to efficiently  look  for a job,  how  not to 
be adversely affected by rejection, how to get by the personnel staff  or 
secretary to the person who makes the hiring decision, etc. Even though 
these individuals are experienced and have marketable skills, they may 
lack knowledge of how to package and present their experience. Providing 
this information is an important and cost effective way of promoting 
reemployment, particularly in combination with the retraining or 
certification of existing skills. 
Labor market counseling, variously called  ''reality  counseling,'' "wage 
and distance counseling," or "wage expectations  counseling," was also 
important to this population. Many dislocated workers expect to find new 
jobs that pay as much or more than their previous job. Often they have 
been employed in the unionized sector of the labor force and expect to 
find the same wage levels in the nonunion labor market. More important, 
they have been in the ''internal'' labor market for many years and do not 
understand the ''external'' labor market.  That is, they  have  to be made 
aware that a senior position within the firm is often posted for bids by 
employees of the firm. This position, once filled by someone from within 
the firm, then creates another vacancy that is also posted. The final job 
listed in the external labor market is often an entry level position. 
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Having been dislocted from an industry, they must now compete in the 
external market for entry level jobs and may not obtain a position similar 
to their previous job. This is hard to swallow for workers who think of 
themselves as responsible and well-paid employees of many years' 
experience, whether they are blue-collar or white-collar workers. In the 
Houston case study,  it was harder for the white-collar  workers  to accept 
this fact than it was for the blue-collar employees. 
Also, many workers do not want to commute to a new job, or to relocate 
to find employment. The necessity of commuting  was evident in the 
Cummins and Cone-Mills projects, located in rural labor markets, and 
most evident in the case of the Minnesota Iron Range project, the only one 
to include a substantial relocation component. 
 
Placement 
Job development and placement activities were part of the re- 
employment strategies for all but one of the observed programs. In most 
projects, self-directed job search or job clubs were combined with job 
development. Placement was occasionally aided by the use of OJT con- 
tracts for participants who could not locate  employment  through  the job 
search, job development, and placement efforts.  For  example,  in the Job 
Search Assistance project in Missouri, participants would receive one to 
three weeks of structured job search assistance. At least 100 par- ticipants 
who did not locate employment after the first week of the job club were 
then placed in OJT slots. 
Job placement activities varied across the projects. The Minnesota Iron 
Range project used the Employment Service job bank to generate job 
leads. Participants were also provided access to in-state and out-of- state 
WATS lines. In Houston,  a Resource  Service  Center supported the job 
search through the program's mandatory job search workshop. Contacts 
were made by canvassing newspapers and through the Texas Employment 
Commission's computerized job bank. 
In the only project that did not emphasize job development, the Pon- 
tiac PREP program, a two-week employability skills component gave 
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job search assistance to former General Motors employees not wanting 
to return to the auto industry. 
The most important point  concerning  the  job development  aspects of 
these programs was the link to the assessment, testing and counsel- ing 
activities described above. This combination, along with the train- ing 
provided, served to produce impressive placement rates at reasonable cost. 
Another issue, illustrated in the Hillsborough Cone-Mills project, is the 
placement of individuals back into the industry from which they were laid 
off. While desirable in the short run, this  may  only  put off the final day 
of reckoning in a declining industry, and may be the non- union equivalent 
of waiting for the plant to reopen. 
Placement back into the same industry may produce high wage replace- 
ment ratios. If the skills are industry-specific, the worker may obtain a 
higher wage by returning to the same industry. On the other hand,  it 
may only delay dislocation from a declining industry, particularly 
where there is a change in the technology of the industry. If the in- 
dividual can obtain a job in the "old" industry but lacks the skills ap- 
propriate to the "new" industry, then the funds may have been spent on 
an individual who will again be dislocated. 
 
Conclusions 
The original conception of Title III contained an implicit program 
model-that dislocated workers had industry-specific skills which, as 
the result of technological change or world competition, had become 
obsolete. A substantial investment in retraining would therefore be re- 
quired to make them employable. However, the inability to specify who 
was a dislocated worker led to the broad targeting of unemployed, ex- 
perienced workers who were ''unlikely to return to their previous in- 
dustry or occupation.'' 
The result was that significant flexibility was granted to states and 
program operators to define the eligible population and the services to  be 
provided to them. State and local officials used the flexibility of speci- 
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fying the target group for the program to respond to the political need 
to '' do something'' about the problem of plant closings or mass layoffs 
in their jurisdictions. 
The flexibility in terms of the services to be provided to participants 
was also used by program officials to respond to the perceived "needs" of 
the eligible population for the projects. Although the ASARCO proj- ect 
probably comes closest to the model originally contemplated, one- third 
of the placements from that program did not require long-term 
institutional training. 
This reflects two other aspects of worker dislocation. First, the skills 
of dislocated workers are not entirely firm-specific. Experienced 
workers, particularly in cyclical industries, may have skills outside their 
job that they rely upon in periods of layoff. Further, as exemplified by 
the Minnesota case study, they may have generic skills resulting from 
their previous jobs that only need to be certified and  "marketed''  to  a 
potential employer. Second, experienced workers may feel the need to 
be employed and/or have a need for immediate income. Thus, they 
have a preference for services (job search or OJT) that result in im- 
mediate employment rather than in long-term training which may hold 
no direct promise of a job. Yet, by virtue of their tenure on their previous 
job, they may not have knowledge of the labor market, how to effi- 
ciently present their skills, or search for a job. Therefore, flexibility in 
terms of the program model and services provided is also seen as 
appropriate to serve the needs of this population. 
The organization, target groups, services provided and placement 
strategies of the projects included in this volume varied widely, accord- 
ing to the cause of the dislocation, the nature of the eligible  popula- tion, 
the labor market in which the project operated, the sources of fund- ing, 
etc. The one commonality of the projects  was that state officials and local 
program operators thought they were successful. That is, they responded 
to the plant closing or layoff that originated the project; they provided the 
services that the population eligible for the project wanted; and, they 
produced results in terms of placement rates and costs per participant that 
proved their success. As noted in the introductory chapter 
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of this volume, state and  local  officials  were,  in every  case,  pleased 
to have national attention given to their program. 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the results of these projects, in 
terms of their longer term net impacts, remain to be determined. Such an 
evaluation would be of strategic national policy interest and impor- tant 
to the reauthorization of the Title III Dislocated Worker Program. 
However, it is probably safe to say that the state officials, local pro- 
gram operators, and dislocated workers served and placed by the proj- 
ects covered in this volume would be unimpressed by the greater 
statistical significance of the results. Of significance is the fact that 
government responded to the local problem of worker dislocation. 
